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1. Introduction 
 
According to many something is rotten in the state of the state. It is the actual level of demo-
cracy in modern western societies that in recent years continuously is questioned. What is 
called for is a greater involvement of citizens in policymaking and implementation. Sugges-
tions range from deliberative polls to direct election of politicians, from referendums to 
clients forums, and from multiple votes to voucher systems. 
Some express their reservations as to this wave of democratisation. They doubt the necessity 
of the changes proposed (is there really something wrong with the present day trust in politics 
and politician, is political participation really that low, etc?) or they question their effective-
ness (will people be willing to participate continuously in forums and referendums, will 
choosing functionaries change something in the publics attitude, etc.). 
The consequences of democratic renewal for the administrative bureaucracy are not often 
taken into consideration. But some of the critics fear that the proper functioning of public 
administration will be undermined by democratic renewal. Introducing a client-approach, for 
instance, implies that the orientation of civil servants will change. It brings in an ethos that is 
at home in business-organisations. Introducing elements from the profit-sector into 
government entails the danger of ethical confusion within public administration, possibly 
leading tot breaches of integrity. (BOVENS 1996; JACOBS 1992) In the same line, concerns 
have been expressed as to the administrators’ orientation towards the common good. (HAQUE 
2000) And, for yet another example, the increasing citizen involvement is sometimes seen as 
pushing out bureaucratic expertise from policy making and implementation. (TONKENS 2003) 
 
Remarkably, in most of the arguments supporting democratic renewal, little is said about the 
consequences for the legitimate functioning of public administration, and bureaucracy therein. 
In the comments that focus on such consequences, on the other hand, the considerations 
backing up proposals for new forms of democracy are mostly neglected. That brings us to the 
question: What is the proper position of bureaucracy in modern democratic society or what 
makes for its legitimate functioning in democracy?  
To answer this question we will turn to the work of Max Weber. One of the reasons therefore, 
of course, is the classical status of his analyses of legitimacy and bureaucracy. In the latter he 
articulated, as we read in every students companion, the preconditions for rational perfor-
mance. One of the major themes in Weber’s work, furthermore, is the danger of  bureaucratic 
domination and civil-servants rule. Weber therein seems to join the contemporary advocacy to 
strengthen democracy. In Weber we expect to find an advocacy for democratisation which 
takes into account the conditions for the legitimate functioning of bureaucracy. 
 
In the following we will first offer an overview of the recent discussion on democratic 
renewal. (section 2.) Next, Weber’s understanding of legitimacy of bureaucracy is addressed. 
Section 4, then, focuses on his understanding of the relation between bureaucracy and 
democracy. As we will see, although Weber opposes civil servants-rule, he is not positive on 
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far-reaching measures of democratisation – measures that were also proposed in his day. His 
arguments in section 5 will be applied to recent proposals of renewal. To defend the relevance 
of Weber’s argument, in section 6 we will confront comments that hold that it is an 
anachronism to turn to Weber in order to discuss the contemporary urge for democratic 
renewal. 
 
 
2. Advocacy for democratic renewal 
 
There seems to have built up a broad consensus holding that citizens are not enough and not 
adequately involved in politics nowadays. This opinion is often expressed in public debate, 
but also in studies in public administration and political science. In such studies the claim that 
major changes in the political system are necessary, often is supported by an analysis of 
fundamental societal developments. Attention, for instance, is drawn to the ‘black holes’, 
containing the powerless and political excluded, that developed in western countries as a 
result of globalisation. (CASTELLS 1996; YOUNG 2000) The rising expectations of citizens and 
their growing competence, as a result of the dominant liberal ideology, the rising level of 
education and the opportunities new technology offer, have been brought to light. Citizens are 
said to be no longer satisfied with their role as voters in representative democracy. (FRISSEN 
1999) And, to give one more example, we have been shown that processes of modernisation 
that have first broken up old societal structures in recent decades brought a ‘new disorder’ that 
cannot be dealt with by ‘modern’ types of policy and democracy. Government in many 
respects has become hopelessly old-fashioned in this ‘post-modernity’; it might have been 
appropriate in the days of developing modernity, but now a major shift towards civil society is 
necessary, especially in implementation. The disordered late modernity that needs deliberative 
democracy; the problems of the risk society that have to be addressed by small group self-
rule; and the diversity of post-modernity that has to be matched by multiple-involvement of 
citizens in a multitude of networks. (BECK 1986; FOX 1995; HABERMAS 1985; HIRST 1994; 
OSBORNE 1992) Others focus on developments in the mode or organisation of governance that 
in some sense have not yet been fully completed. Shifts in governance are not yet followed by 
compensating measures to establish accountability and responsibility. (PIERRE 2000; VAN 
KERSBERGEN 2001) 
In the diagnoses and remedies given we can distinguish three categories of furthering the 
involvement of citizens: in policymaking, in implementation and in control. Some stress that 
the possibilities for citizens to be actually involved in politics and policy making are too little. 
The voices of many citizens are in fact not heard. The representative system reduces the 
participation of the many to voting once every four years. What are needed, in this line of 
reasoning, are new forms of deliberative democracy and other forms of direct democracy, like 
referendums, citizen-polls, or direct election of executive officials  (DRYZEK 2000; YOUNG 
2000) As to policy implementation, analysts have argued that adequate and efficient delivery 
of public services asks for more involvement of the recipients of these services: demand-
steering, co-production, client-approach. (HIRST 1994; OSBORNE 1992) A third category of 
measures of democratisation involves new arrangements of accountability and control. Such 
measures are meant to remedy the loss of legitimacy of public institutions; citizens doubt their 
accountability. New arrangements are presented, arrangements that involve the introduction 
or strengthening of forums of accountability consisting of citizens or their representatives 
(strengthening the position of parliament, transparency, dualism), but also the introduction of 
new forums (of client-groups for instance). (VAN KERSBERGEN 2001) 
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These diagnoses and remedies have been fiercely commented. Some have questioned the 
empirical grounds of the diagnoses: has the societal field really changed that dramatically? 
Have citizens indeed become to distrust the political system and the politicians more than in 
earlier years? Do the often quoted figures of decreasing voting turnouts give us any insight in 
citizens opinion on politics and democracy ? etc. [verw.] Others focused on the likely effects 
of the instruments: will, for instance, extending the possibilities for citizen participation make 
for an increase in the involvement of citizens, especially of those that are excluded now? 
(HOOGHE 1999)  
Some comments criticise the diagnoses, others the effectiveness of the remedies proposed. 
What not always is made explicit, however, is that the advocacy for (new) forms of 
democracy champions the position and interests of citizens, and (at least by implication) 
seems to be opposing public administration, and more specifically the bureaucracy. Furthering 
citizens’ input in policymaking is often presented as an alternative to bureaucratic planning. 
(FRISSEN 1999; HABERMAS 1985) New instruments of accountability are proposed in reaction 
to bureaucratic organisations getting to much discretion. (VAN KERSBERGEN 2001) And 
participation in implementation is said to be necessary to fight the bureaucratic pest of routine 
and uniformity. (OSBORNE 1992) If their position is considered, in the arguments for 
democratisation public administration, and bureaucracy in particular, are seen as part of the 
problem. The bureaucrats’ discretion should be curtailed, their power controlled and the 
bureaucratic apparatus should be reduced in size. These comments follow the older tradition 
of fighting the threat of bureaucratic power. (CROZIER 1963; HAYEK 1944; VON MISES 1944) 
But the contemporary advocacy for democratisation seems to go a step further than the older 
proposals to curtail and control bureaucracy. They involve the expansion of democracy itself: 
introducing new forms of citizen participation and popular control, with a scope well beyond 
simple representative democracy. 
But then a question arises: What effect do the proposed and implemented measures of 
democratisation have for a proper functioning of bureaucracy? Initiatives to strengthen 
(direct) democracy and accountability might undermine a competent bureaucratic functioning, 
threatening in turn governmental performance, public trust and the like. (HAQUE 2000; 
JACOBS 1992) Paradoxically the remedies proposed would then contribute to the problem that 
they are supposed to address.  
For an exploration of this issue it might be worthwhile to turn to Max Weber’s work. One of 
the themes in his work is precisely bureaucratic domination and civil-servants rule 
endangering democracy. But the same work contains his classical treatise on the advantages 
of bureaucratic rationality. What then makes, according to Weber, for bureaucracies 
legitimate functioning?  
 
 
2. Bureaucracy and legitimacy 
 
In public and lawful government, Weber holds in Economy and Society (1921), bureaucratic 
authority is constituted by the fixed ordering of its duties and the commanding structure and 
by a methodical provision of means in order to fulfil those duties. (ES 196) 1  It is with his 
well known list of principles of bureaucratic organisation, then, that Weber gives us a clearer 
picture of this authoritative entity: office hierarchy, jurisdictional competency, management 
based on written documents and following general rules, expert training, a tenured position 
                                                          
1 Citations from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft and Weber’s Political Wrintings are, when they are included in that 
anthology, taken from the English edition by  H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology (Routledge London, 1991). The reference reads ES and page-number. Otherwise reference is made to 
the German Mohr-edition. The translation, then, is mine. 
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for officials, and the like. (ES 197-204) “Bureaucracy, thus understood”, Weber assures us, 
“is fully developed only in the modern state.”(ES 196) 
Why and in what sense can bureaucracy be said to be an authority when having the 
characteristics just mentioned? To answer this question in this section we will first turn to 
Weber’s types of legitimacy and ask how they may constitute a bureaucracy’s legitimacy. As 
we shall see, to give a full answer to this question we also need to take into account Weber’s 
analysis of modernity.  
 
Bureaucracy and the three forms of legitimacy 
 “If a state is to exist”, we read on the first page of Politics as a Vocation (1918), “the 
dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be.” (ES 78) When and why do 
people obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this 
domination rest? As to the external means, Weber is brief. Obedience might be motivated by 
fear, hope and interests. (ES 79) His real interest, however, is in the inner justifications. He 
distinguishes three varieties: the authority of the ‘eternal yesterday’ of tradition, the authority 
of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma) and, thirdly, domination by virtue of 
legality (legal statute and functional competence based on rationally created rules). (ES 78/9) 
In this analysis of legitimacy, Weber’s focus is the position of the leader, the power holder, 
the politician. The considerations are not explicitly extended to the position of bureaucracy. 
Here and in other places, however, Weber’s work contains suggestions to articulate the 
grounds for a legitimate functioning of administrative bureaucracy.  
After presenting his three type of legitimacy Weber notes that in whatever way the political 
leadership is justified, domination has to be organised. And organised domination requires 
control over the personal executive staff and the material implements of the administration. 
The administrative staff, which externally represents the organisation of political dominion, 
is, like in any other organisation, bound by obedience to the power holder. (ES 80) This brings 
us to a first understanding of bureaucracy’s legitimacy: the authority of the state bureaucracy 
can be derived from the authority of the power holder. The more it functions as an extension 
of the power holder, the more it shares in his authority. Weber’s ideal typical bureaucracy is 
designed in such manner that the guarantees for such a functioning are maximised.  
Bureaucracy’s authority in that way is been given an indirect ground. Its legitimacy can, 
however, also be derived from Weber’s categories of legitimacy in a more direct way. In the 
first two kinds of legitimacy for domination, it is particularly the authority of persons that is 
justified. But in the last the inner justification rests on the proper discharge of obligations 
following from legal statute. “This domination is exercised by the modern ‘servant of the 
state’ and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him.” (ES 79) That 
comprises every official acting within the bureaucratic organisation that is regulated by law. 
Weberian bureaucracy being ordered by legal rules and regulations then shares directly in the 
legitimacy of the legal order. How, more precisely, must we understand the relation between 
law and bureaucracy? 
 
Bureaucracy and legality 
To fully understand the relationship between bureaucracy and law, we have to take into 
account Weber’s analysis of modernity. Western modernisation, according to Weber, is 
characterised by the ongoing process of rationalisation. Rationality therein means: The 
theoretical or practical control or ordering of reality, the ordering being intentional and 
systematic in character. (KALBERG 1981) Rationalisation can and does take place in all 
domains of society. It always amounts to an increasing knowledge of and power of man over 
his environment. Human activities become more effective and efficient, and predictability 
increases. In western society the sphere of the economy rationalised into the capitalist mode, 
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including specific ways of organisation of labour, the production process, property-relations, 
etc. The same goes for the fields of science and technology, education, art and music but, 
importantly, also law and government. (DASSEN 1999) 
Law, in its typical modern form, is, according to Weber, a system of formal and abstract rules 
that is internally consistent and that encompasses rules for deciding logically on specific cases 
(subsumption under general rules). Such a modern system of law differs from conceptions of 
law in which judgement on specific cases follows revelations or in which analogies are used. 
(ES 216) What modern law does most of all is making broad arrays of social life more 
predictable. In economy, in criminal law, etc. modern law gives a clear indication of the 
consequences of specific actions. Also the (state-)bureaucracy is to be understood as part of 
this rationalising modernity. Bureaucracy has a purely technical superiority over any other 
form of organisation. “The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other 
organisations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. 
Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict 
subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the 
optimum point in a strictly bureaucratic administration”. (ES 214) Because of its machinelike 
functioning the bureaucracy contributes just like modern law, to the predictability of 
governmental action. 
The modern Weberian bureaucracy takes care of an objective discharge of business - that 
means acting according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons’. The objective 
experts employed in bureaucracy do not act on personal sympathy and favour, nor are they 
motivated by grace and gratitude. When fully developed, bureaucracy also stands under the 
principle of sine ira ac studio. Bureaucratic functioning, therefore, corresponds perfectly with 
a rational enactment of modern law. That is rational subsumption under general rules and not 
irrationally deciding on specific emotional, political or ethical appreciation. (ES 215/6, 221) 
 
Bureaucracy and democracy 
So bureaucracy, just like modern law, embodies typical modern rationalisation. And in doing 
so it fulfils an vital role in modern mass democracy. Only through its strict organisation and 
its development and maintenance of expertise rational conduct in government and other 
spheres of society is possible. “Bureaucratic administration (...) is indispensable fur the needs 
of the mass-administration of our days. The only alternative to bureaucratisation is 
‘dilettantisation’.” (WEBER 1990: 128)  According to Weber “(b)ureaucratic organisation 
inevitably accompanies mass democracy in contrast to the democratic self-government of 
small homogeneous units.”(ES 224) Only through bureaucracy the continuity of (govern-
mental) expertise can be guaranteed. Civil servants need to be recruited according to their 
expertise in matters of administration, and promoted according to seniority as they broaden 
their knowledge over the years. The specific forms of knowledge or expertise (“Wissen”) 
administrators come to apprehend are, according to Weber, “Fachwissen” (technical 
expertise), “Dienstwissen” (knowledge of files and administrative procedure). (WEBER 1988: 
352) 
Also in another sense the progress of bureaucratisation in the state administration is a parallel 
phenomenon of democracy. “Mass democracy makes a clean sweep of the feudal, 
patrimonial, and – at least in intent – the plutocratic privileges in administration. Unavoidably 
it puts paid professional labour in place of the historically inherited avocational administration 
by notables.”(ES 224/5) 
 
The intimate relation between bureaucracy and law and the metaphor of machine-like 
functioning might easily bring about a misunderstanding as to an amoral character of 
bureaucracy. Bureaucratic functioning for civil servants also implies acting according to an 
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ethos. “The honour of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the 
order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. (...) 
Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the whole apparatus would 
fall to pieces.” (ES 95) The ethos of the civil servant contrasts that of a political leader. He has 
to take a stand, to be passionate; his honour lies precisely in an exclusive personal 
responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he cannot and must not transfer. The 
bureaucratic ethos thereby has its place in a democratic system in which it are the political 
power holders that can and must be held accountable. 
 
Summing up: bureaucracy’s legitimacy 
In Weber’s work we found several ways to articulate an administrative bureaucracy’s 
legitimacy. First the legitimacy of bureaucratic authority can be understood to follow the 
legitimacy of the power holder. The more that power holder and bureaucracy can be seen to 
function as one, the more the latter can share in the legitimacy of the first.  
The legitimacy of bureaucracy can also be understood in a more direct sense. Bureaucracy is 
part of the legal system: in its dealing it effectuates legal principles and enacts lawful 
decisions. Even stronger: bureaucracy fulfils the same kind of function law does. As its 
actions are rule-guided and impersonal it, just like modern law, makes for predictability of 
state-behaviour.  
Thirdly, bureaucracy typically makes for expert and efficient administration. According to 
Weber it therewith has an indispensable function in modern mass-democracy. Bureaucracy, 
together with modern law, for Weber, embodies rationality. It is tempting to understand 
rationalising modernity as valuable. For instance because of the promise of human autonomy 
that it entails: the growing grip of man on his environment. Elements for such a valuation of 
modernity in Weber’s work have been pointed out. (DASSEN 1999; TURNER 1991) However, 
we need not follow such interpretations. Weber is very clear on a related point: if one values 
democracy in modern society, one cannot do without bureaucracy. On the value of democracy 
Weber is brief and straightforward: the superiority of democracy appears as an evident truth 
in his political writings. But are bureaucracy and democracy simply complementary?  
 
 
3. The threat of bureaucratic dominance 
 
Modern democratic society needs bureaucracy. At the same time, Weber stresses “that 
‘democracy’ as such is opposed to the ‘rule’ of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of 
its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucracy.”(ES 231) The power position of a 
fully developed bureaucracy is very strong. “The ‘political master’ finds himself in the 
position of the ‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert’”. (ES 232) (Political master here 
meaning, the public, as well as political leaders or the parliament.) Moreover, the bureaucratic 
officials can transform their “Dienstwissen” into “Geheimwissen” by keeping their 
knowledge and intentions secret. Every bureaucracy, Weber notes, seeks to increase its 
superiority in this manner. (ES 233, WEBER 1988: 353) As in the history of western 
modernisation governmental systems became constitutionalised, the bureaucracy and the 
political ruler were bound together into a community of interest, in opposition to the party 
chiefs in parliament. (ES 234)  
 
The term ‘democratisation’, Weber observes, can in a loose sense mean the minimisation of 
the civil servants’ ruling power in favour of the greatest possible direct rule of the demos. He, 
however, follows a stricter understanding. Democracy for him implies a levelling of the 
governed in opposition to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group. In his 
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understanding democracy includes two postulates: “(1) the prevention of the development of a 
closed status group of officials in the interest of a universal accessibility of office, and (2) 
minimisation of the authority of officialdom in the interest of expanding the sphere of 
influence of  public opinion as far as practical.” (ES 226) A central instrument of political 
democracy in that respect is shortening the term of office of the chief executive officials by 
election and recall. (ES 226, 242) 
 
‘The Iron Cage of Bureaucracy’ 
Bureaucratisation and democratisation are inevitable companions, which at the same time 
oppose one another. In most of his writings it is the power and domination of bureaucracy that 
Weber worries about. Sometimes these worries concern the specific situation of the German 
government of his day. (We will come to that in the next section.) In other places it is the 
more general threat that bureaucracy as an embodiment of rationalisation poses to man’s 
freedom. In a dramatic rhetoric Weber asks: How is in the ongoing bureaucratisation any 
residue of individual freedom at all to be rescued and how can democracy at all be possible? 
What bureaucracy does not have is leading spirit, it is ‘solidified spirit’. (WEBER 1988: 333/4) 
Weber was aware of effects of rationalisation that are unintentional, disappointing and even 
frustrating rationality. In line with other early students of modernisation he pointed out the 
loss of meaning in the process of rationalisation (“Entzauberung”). The sciences leave little 
room for mysteries and the rationalisation of societal relations undermines feelings of 
belonging. And the process of rationalisation makes for routines and organisations that in 
effect restrain individual freedom. In the field of government that leads up to the threat of the 
Iron Cage of Bureaucracy. Rationalisation, for Weber, means getting systematic grip on his 
environment. At the same time however it means dissolving myth and meaning and the 
narrowing of freedom. And the ambivalence Weber has towards modernisation in general, he 
expresses for bureaucratisation more specifically. On the one hand it is indispensable in 
modern mass society; on the other bureaucracy is the ‘slave-house of the future’. (DASSEN 
1999; TURNER 1991: xxiv) 
 
‘Rule of the civil servants’ 
In many of his Political Writings Weber addressed the flaws, as he saw them, in German 
politics and especially in the German governmental system and political culture of his time. 
What he pointed out time and again was a predominance of bureaucrats (“Beambten-
herrschaft”). In government, but also in parliament he did not see political leadership, but only 
a civil servant mentality – there was no real political strive. Moreover, parliament was 
engaged only in ‘negative politics’, as Weber called it. It offered critique, demagogic 
speeches were held, and governmental bills were discussed. Positively involved in policy 
making, however, it was not. Nor was its control of Government very effective. Because of its 
‘negative politics’ the relation between parliament and government was continually one of 
hostility. That meant that parliament was continuously excluded from information. For Weber 
this state of affairs was an inheritance of the Bismarck regime. Bismarck had removed real 
politicians from the stage and held parliament in check. But now, without Bismarck in charge, 
political life still followed the old routines. (ES 95, WEBER 1988: 335/40, 351, 392)  
 
As we saw in an earlier section, according to Weber, modernisation, democratisation, and 
bureaucratisation go together. At the same time however, so he pointed out, bureaucratisation 
does not completely fulfil modernity’s promise of autonomy. And indispensable as it may be, 
bureaucracy also threatens democratic rule.  
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4. Weber on democratic renewal 
 
In many of his Political Writings, Weber argues for change. Real political leaders had to 
replace the ‘bureaucrats’ of his day.  That, he argued, could be enhanced by strengthening the 
position of the parliament. (Notably by introducing a right of inquiry for the Reichstag; an 
instrument, however, that should be used in moderation.) When parliament really makes a 
difference those with power instinct and leadership qualities will step forward. Parliament 
should not only be talking but also working, that is ‘controlling in co-operation’ (“mit-
arbeitend kontrolliert”). To overcome simple demagogy in powerlessness, parliament 
permanently needs to educate itself: to get information that makes control possible. Effective 
parliamentary control makes for publicity in government. What Weber saw as a necessity was 
the development of professional politicians. And that also meant a drastic change in the 
received party-culture. (WEBER 1988: 341, 350/5, 361, 364) 
In other European states of his day, Weber saw that the production of real political leadership 
could take place in different circumstances. The constitutions and the party-organisations in 
countries like Great Britain or Italy differed, but in each situation leaders emerged and 
Government (and bureaucracy) could adequately be checked by parliament. Strong 
parliaments and responsible political parties are an important precondition for a functioning 
democratic system. (WEBER 1988: 403) 
 
Radically renewing democracy? 
Weber criticised those of his contemporaries that wanted to break the power of bureaucrats 
and were looking for answers in communism, syndicalism or corporatism. They did not see, 
Weber pointed out, that even drastic changes in society, could not do away with bureaucracy. 
A ‘societal revolution’ would only bring more power to the bureaucracy. In a communist 
system, for instance, abandoning private property would simply, make for an increase in 
bureaucratic tasks. A new system without a parliament, as those opting for communes would 
like it, would bring bureaucratic-rule without control. (WEBER 1988: 331/3, 395/6) 
Weber also commented proposals for direct democracy, like referendums and the direct 
election of executive officials.  Such changes, he argued, are unnecessary, unproductive and 
even dangerous when parliament performed its tasks properly.  
For referendums, Weber only sees a necessity in extraordinary circumstances as an ultima 
ratio. He points out serious disadvantages like the exclusion of compromise and the danger of 
citizens getting fed up. But central in his discussion of these forms of direct democracy is the 
incompetence of citizens and their limited scope. (‘The perspective of the masses only reaches 
until the day after tomorrow.’) In the complex affairs, in which especially the bureaucracy has 
adequate knowledge, the danger of citizen’s deception looms large. Through direct democracy 
proper ‘co-operative control’ is not possible. (WEBER 1988: 397-400, 404) 
The call for direct elections of officials, especially of political leaders, according to Weber is a 
direct consequence of the development of mass-democracy. Political leaders win the trust of 
the masses through means of mass-demagogy. Modernisation in mass-societies engenders, 
what he calls, a ‘caesaric tendency’. Every mass-democracy is inclined towards it. The 
plebiscite not simply means popular vote, but the expressing of a belief. Every parliamentary 
system, however, tries to resist this ‘caesaric tendency’. Where political leaders are directly 
chosen,  parliament will hindered in its controlling task. Here again, however, in extraordinary 
situations, in times of war for instance, plebiscites might be appropriate. (WEBER 1988: 393/5) 
On the descriptive level, Weber observes that societal tendencies of development of 
parliaments and democratisation are not necessarily complementary. Plebiscites weaken the 
power of party-leaders and tend to undermine the responsibility of bureaucrats. (WEBER 1988: 
383, 399) But Weber’s Political Writings contain also a more prescriptive stance: In the 
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modern political setting, in which bureaucracy is indispensable, but at the same time has to be 
controlled effectively and skilful, it is a competent parliament that is needed, not measures of 
direct democracy. 
 
Consequences for bureaucracy’s legitimate functioning 
Weber has his reservations as to democratisation. He underlines the necessity of a parliament 
having the proper instruments to effectively control governmental bureaucracy. The members 
of parliament have to be skilled and well informed to make ‘positive politics’ possible. There 
can be a deficit in controlling tools. But there can easily be too much of it. Then, the danger of 
bureaucracy taking a defensive stand looms large, resulting again in ‘negative politics’. As to 
citizen participation, in its direct democratic sense, Weber is highly critical. The masses are 
poorly informed and easy to deceive. There is a natural urge in mass-democracies for 
populism and a direct role for citizens. The proper control of the inevitable – and inevitable 
powerful – bureaucracy is only possible by a well established parliament and properly 
functioning political parties therein bringing forward real politicians. 
 
We can conclude that the dominant line in Weber’s treatment of the issue of democratisation 
and bureaucracy is that some new instruments of democratisation might be in place, 
specifically to further control of administrative bureaucracy. However, many forms of 
democratisation are likely to hinder effective control. 
It is remarkable that in his work no concern is shown for any undermining of expertise, 
rational and legal functioning or bureaucratic ethos. It is the proper balance and relationship 
between bureaucracy and (representative) democracy that Weber is worried about.   
 
 
5. Rival understandings of rationality and democracy 
 
In the presentation of Weber’s position on issues of bureaucracy and democracy, we also 
pointed out his particular understanding of democracy and rationality. Now the question 
might be raised what it would mean if those understandings would have been (slightly) 
different. Wouldn’t there be a stronger case for democratisation if rationality and democracy 
would be understood less instrumental then Weber did? And what would that mean for the 
bureaucracy’s legitimate functioning? 
 
the value of political participation 
Democracy in Weber’s understanding concerns being able to defend one’s interests. In a full 
democracy measures have been taken to guarantee that decisions are taken, not to the benefit 
of a specific group, but in the interest of all. The value of democracy and citizen participation, 
however, can also be understood differently, that is as of intrinsic worth. The understanding of 
democracy that Weber adheres to basically means popular control of governmental power in 
order to guarantee political liberty for all. This understanding fits the tradition of Locke and 
De Montesquieu, but is also present in the system of checks and balances in Aristotle’s 
Politics. Individual or group interests are understood as given. Democratic arrangements 
should guarantee that the interests of some minority are not continuously neglected. In a 
second understanding democratic participation contributes to the development of the 
individual. To be involved in the polity’s ruling entails the possibility to develop one’s 
qualities. Being active and proficient in societal affairs fulfils an important human potential. 
This understanding we find in Aristotle’s Ethics, but also, for instance, in J.S. Mill. Political 
participation here is not of external value (that is an instrument to look after one’s interests), 
but intrinsically valuable (it is itself part of that interest).  
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Arguing from the latter understanding of democracy, probably much stronger support could 
be given to recent proposals for augmenting citizen involvement then what Weber offered. 
(KLIJN 2000)  
Whether that presupposition is correct, is an issue for another study. 2  That there might be 
other reasons for citizen participation than safeguarding everyone’s interest, however, does 
not undermine Weber’s argument. For him the central issue is whether some democratic 
arrangement can control the indispensable but potentially overpowering bureaucracy. 
Democratic renewals, and probably especially the renewals that are motivated by ideals of 
participation as intrinsically valuable, threaten effective control. 
 
communicative or  instrumental rationality 
Also to Weber’s understanding of rationality alternatives can be formulated. In his use of the 
concept of rationality he was sometimes ambiguous. But generally speaking, rationality for 
Weber seems to be of an instrumentalist kind: it involves realising efficiently given aims. 
(DASSEN 1999; KALBERG 1981) To understand its specificity it is often contrasted with 
Habermas’ communicative rationality. Habermas distinguishes his concept from that of 
instrumental rationality by the specific way it aspires to include human interaction. In the 
communicative understanding of rationality, it is not the efficient realisation of given aims, 
but deliberation according to proper procedures that is crucial. The proper procedures 
facilitate and guarantee a free exchange of points of view on problems and solutions, 
eventually leading to mutually acceptable conclusions. (HABERMAS 1992) 
One way of understanding the bureaucracy’s legitimacy is, as we pointed out earlier, its 
indispensability in rational governance. If a better understanding of rationality gives reason 
for a more limited role of bureaucracy, Weber’s position on that issue loses ground. In fact a 
communicative understanding of rationality often is used to argue for greater involvement of 
societal actors in policymaking. (YOUNG 2000) In the new ‘disordered’ society the classical 
way of rational problem solving is outdated. New approaches are necessary, approaches that 
mean bringing in knowledge and insights of different societal actors, deliberation in 
policymaking, direct democracy, citizen’s involvement in implementation, etc. (HABERMAS 
1992) The legitimate role of the ‘rational bureaucracy’, then, seems to be but very limited.  
 
Does this mean that Weber’s conclusions are less relevant? There seem to be good reasons not 
to dismiss them right away. First of all we have to ask on what ground communicative 
rationality can be judged to be better or preferable to instrumental rationality. If  the answer is 
that through policymaking processes in which different perspectives are involved effective 
solutions to societal  problems will be realised more efficient, then we in fact still adhere to an 
instrumental understanding of rationality. If the answer is that in this way we can really give 
all the involved their due, then we are re-directed to the issue of democracy and participation.  
The question also arises what implementing the communicative concept of rationality really 
implies for bureaucracy. If furthering communicative rationality in public administration 
means more contacts, dialogue and negotiations between politicians on the one hand and all 
kinds of societal groups on the other, and citizens, and contacts with all kinds of societal 
groups, the consequences for bureaucracy are not that serious. What is most likely to happen 
is that bureaucrats develop a ‘second-order-expertise’ on deliberative-procedures, relevant 
files, and the line. Changes will probably have more impact on politicians. Deliberating with 
specific groups will make for a second forum, next to that of the representative assembly. It 
complicates the processes of gaining trust and authority. (KLIJN 2000) As long as public 
administration consists of accountable politicians ruling and a bureaucracy supporting them, 
instrumental rationality is of relevance. Of course the concept of communicative rationality 
                                                          
2 See my ‘Bedenkingen bij bestuurlijke vernieuwing. J.S. Mill over bestuurlijke kwaliteit’.  
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might be used to argue for forms of governance in which a central public administration is – 
to some extent - replaced by a network of agencies and organisations in which citizens 
participate in plurality. (FRISSEN 1999) It is of course uncertain whether citizens would be 
able and willing to be involved in the amount of participation that would imply – one of 
Weber’s doubts as to forms of direct democracy. But what especially demands attention here 
is the danger of minority domination and elite-rule. As we saw above, Weber’s instrumentally 
rational bureaucracy is combined with parliamentary democracy. In this way effective 
problem-solving and fairness in political decision making are both guaranteed. The concept of 
communicative rationality brings both aspects into the very same arena. In a deliberative 
setting solutions to problems have to be worked out, under procedural constraints that ideally 
make for ‘domination-free-dialogue’. Realising that, however, brings about the need for new 
forms of supervision. (New) agencies are demanded for that monitor the rule-following and 
actual fairness of the relative autonomous organisations that develop and implement policies 
with client-groups. Such controlling agencies most likely rapidly develop into bureaucracies.  
The recent arguments for governance without government echo the ideas of communists and 
anarchists that Weber commented on. A diverse and complex modern society cannot do 
without bureaucracies. (If it did the valued effective and efficient realisation of public goods 
would be impossible.) Bringing the realisation of public services in some sense into civil 
society (and away from government) will not do away with bureaucracies; it will only make 
those bureaucracies more powerful.  
 
We can agree that some of the central concepts in Weber’s work might be judged as narrow or 
one sided. That goes for instance for his instrumental understanding of democratic 
participation and of rationality. His analysis of the relation between democracy and 
bureaucracy thereby, however, cannot be said to be invalid or irrelevant. Proposals for 
democratic renewal following alternative concepts of democratic participation and rationality 
cannot neglect the concerns Weber brought forward.  
 
 
6. A modernist analysis in post-modernity? 
 
So far we dealt with some of Weber’s central concepts. Critics might also doubt the relevance 
fur us of Weber’s conclusions in another way. The contemporary condition is of a 
fundamentally different kind than the modern, or modernising, social environment he was 
writing about. Many of the diagnoses that give reason for democratic renewal – diagnoses we 
mentioned earlier – in fact hold some such position. Our condition is understood to be late-
modern or post-modern and demands for new forms of democracy and governance. (BECK 
1986; CASTELLS 1996; FOX 1995; FRISSEN 1999) These critics would probably subscribe to 
one or more of the following comments: 
- Epistemological. Weber’s work belongs to the modernist school of sociology, with an 
unambiguous claim to truth. Writing well before the insights of the linguistic turn in social 
sciences became commonplace, his work follows the naive modern idea of text objectively 
representing reality. Without the insight that language makes ‘reality’, and that each specific 
discursive ‘representation’ is inevitably value-laden he misses the post-modern understanding 
that knowledge is inseparable from perspective. In order words: Weber’s representation of 
reality is just one of many possible representations and there is no reason to not exchange it 
for another, especially one that is we feel to be liberating or provocative. (FRISSEN 1999) 
- Ontological. Modern understandings of social reality focus on structure, rationality, unity 
and harmony. What the moderns lack, is an open eye for the fundamental plurality, diversity 
and, not unimportant, antagonism in every aspect of the social domain. Modern accounts of 
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the political, like that of Weber, miss the essential plurality and rivalry and even, 
unintentionally, aim for de-differentiation. (MOUFFE 1999)  
- Ethical. Modern bureaucracy, perfectly embodying rationality as Weber clearly pointed out, 
is highly immoral. What bureaucracy actually does, is substituting technical for moral 
responsibility. Division of labour, routines, hierarchy, that all makes for a silencing of 
morality in the organisation. Persons within it function as immoral machines. This logic 
makes for an irresponsibility that leads directly to the Holocaust. (BAUMAN 1989) 
 
As to the epistemological comment we could be brief and disqualify the post-modern 
epistemology as being evidently self-defeating. (For instance because of the contradiction 
between dismissing all truth-aspiring theories and yet being itself truth-aspiring.) For a more 
substantial reply, however, we can refer to Weber’s own excursus on social sciences and the 
need for interpretation. [verw.] Weber acknowledges there the inevitability of ‘representing’ 
reality in a way that is meaningful for us. That, however, does not bring him to the conclusion 
that truth-aspiration is futile. The reply to post-modern critiques here should be that the 
interpretative approaches in social sciences, like that of Weber, had already taken into account 
the insights that would much later become known as ‘linguistic turn’. It is always possible to 
offer an interpretation that is better, that makes more sense. It are the postmodernist who 
radicalised epistemological insights beyond reason.  
Turning to the ontological point we must retort that Weber in fact did take pluralisation and 
social differentiation into account. In Politics as a Vocation, for instance, he takes it to be a 
crucial feature of modern society. [PaB / aangeh Du Gay 47] Politics he defines in terms of a 
struggle for power and specifically not in terms of some aim, for instance an harmonic social 
order. (ES 78) Bureaucracy is indeed characterised (in the ideal typical sense) as a rationally 
ordered organisation. But is we above saw, he was worried that a civil servants mentality 
would eliminate political struggle from parliament. Furthermore, he opposed communists and 
others in their aspiration for governance without politics, without a parliament as an arena for 
the democratic political strife. 
But also on a deeper level Weber showed being aware of plurality and complexity. In his 
analysis of modernisation as rationalisation he also pointed out the unintended consequences. 
Modernisation is his perspective does not mean a simple development of increasing mastery 
over our environment. It also includes tendencies like ‘ceasarism’ or populism and demands 
for direct vote that in fact are at odds with rational governance. One can say that the issues 
and developments that are often presented as typically post-modern, are phenomena that 
Weber understood to be part of modernity. (TURNER 1991, xxviii) 
On the ethical issue, finally, we have to reply to comments like that of Bauman that Weber 
does not characterise bureaucracy as amoral, but as incorporating a specific ethos. The 
bureaucrats loyalty, neutrality and rule-adherence is part of an ethical scheme. It is a scheme 
that must be understood in its relation to the democratic parliamentary system. In Nazi-
Germany it was exactly the democratic political strive in parliament that was eliminated. (DU 
GAY 2000: 52) 
Letting the plurality of perspectives in ethics and politics have its way, as Bauman wants to 
have it, is not different from Weber’s ideal. The latter, however, does not think bureaucracy to 
be the proper locus for it in a constitutional and democratic state.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
In recent years many proposals for democratic renewal or democratisation have been 
presented and realised. The diagnoses leading up to these proposals vary. The position of the 
public administration and especially of the bureaucracy is not always specifically addressed. 
When it is, it is often seen as part of the problem. Democracy, so the general message seems 
to be, has to be protected against civil-service rule and bureaucratic dominance.  
Our question in this paper has been: what is the legitimate function of bureaucracy in 
democracy and what effect might democratisation thereupon have? Or, put in a more critical 
manner: what does further democratisation mean for the legitimate functioning of 
bureaucracy? To answer this question we turned to Max Weber. In students companions 
reference is often made to his worries about bureaucratic domination. And what makes him 
even more appropriate for this investigation is that he brought forward analyses of 
bureaucratic functioning and legitimacy. 
A closer look at Weber’s work confirmed his concern for democracy being threatened by 
bureaucratic dominance. He gives reason for measures strengthening democracy, especially 
representative democracy. Adequate control of government and bureaucracy by parliament is 
necessary. But (the use of) strong instruments of control easily make for ‘negative politics’. In 
such case the antagonistic relation between parliament en bureaucracy provokes a defensive 
attitude in bureaucracy, enhancing secrecy. The parliament finds itself in the position of an 
ignorant dilettante. Effective control is in effect undermined. That goes even stronger for 
forms of direct democracy.  
Although for Weber bureaucracy fulfils important functions in modern society, he is not 
afraid of democracy undermining its expertise, its rational and legal functioning or its ethos. 
Also in cases in which democratisation is motivated by other reasons, Weber draws attention 
to the problem of control and the dangers of bureaucratic domination.  
 
Weber gave reason to be concerned about the legitimate functioning of bureaucracy in the 
face of democratisation. Not because its ethos or expertise would be undermined, but because 
democratisation – even when it is explicitly meant to control bureaucracy – might lead to 
bureaucratic dominance. Debates on democratic renewal mostly focus on the likely effects of 
new measures on the relation between citizens and government: will it enhance public trust, 
will it make politicians more responsive, and the like. That more democracy simply makes for 
more control of the administrative bureaucracy is commonly presupposed. Weber makes us 
question that presupposition 
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